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ABSTRACT
In this paper I introduce a (new) distinction in human rights theory, 
between two types of genuine obligations corresponding to human rights: 
a) obligations that require us to rule out specific considerations for treating 
people in a certain way, such as the obligation not to consider Jane’s skin 
color when deciding whether she should be permitted to enter a shop or 
the obligation not to take political expediency as a consideration relevant 
to whether political opponents should be silenced, and b) an obligation to 
give some weight to different interests: those interests people have in 
enjoying certain conditions and those of people who must carry burdens 
to create these conditions, when deciding what must be done for rights 
holders. For example, we must weigh the interest Jane has in seeing certain 
improved access to secured health care versus the interests of other 
members of Jane’s society in not facing significantly-increasing tax 
burdens, or seeing reduced social opportunities for their ends, as these will 
impact on their abilities to pursue their own personal life projects. Both 
types of interest matter, so to resolve how much health provision Jane is 
entitled to have we need to know how to weigh them against each other – 
we need an index. These different types of obligations, with their basis in 
different forms of reasoning, cut across categories of human rights and can 
both exist for any one human right. Accepting the distinction means 
accepting that we must pay careful attention to how a human right is given 
content in the form of obligations. It also re-introduces conceptions of 
distributive justice as a necessary component in solving how conflicting 
interests should be weighed an “index” for such weighing.
Keywords: human rights; responsibilities; obligations; conflicting 
interests; weighing; categorical reasons; excluded reasons; distributive 
justice; fairness.
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1. INTRODUCTION 
A slogan adopted by the United Nations, echoing an account by Henry 
Shue, says that the duties corresponding to human rights are to “respect, 
protect, and fulfil” those rights (Shue 1996: 52; CESCR 1999a: s. 15; CESCR 
1999b: s. 46; CESCR 2000: s. 33). This, of course, means the duties are to 
respect, protect, and fulfil people’s secure enjoyment of the content or 
objects of those rights as described in international instruments. However, 
a problem with these headings is that they do not explain how we should 
allocate the burdens of these different types of duties and justify the 
allocation for those that will execute them or bear the costs of their 
execution – ultimately the citizens of each society.
In this paper, I introduce a different categorization of duties. This cuts 
across, rather than underpinning, traditional distinctions between types 
of human rights – such as Civil and Political (CivPol) rights versus Economic 
and Social (EcoSoc) rights, liberty rights versus benefit rights, or even 
rights with positive obligations versus those with negative obligations, 
distinctions that have been debated in the literature.1 This new 
categorization is not intended to map onto debates where authors defend 
or dispute that such distinctions exist or use a categorization to undermine 
the importance of any specific group of rights. Instead, the argument lies 
within the sphere of genuine obligations. It neither challenges the existence 
of the two categories of obligations I set out, nor questions the rights to 
which they give substance. Indeed, for many traditionally understood 
rights in either of the above CivPol or EcoSoc categories, both of my types 
of duty will apply. The point of the distinction I introduce is rather to help 
us think about what it means to satisfy obligations and when it is appropriate 
to satisfy an obligation in one way rather than the other. The distinction 
focuses practically on how to adjudicate or claim different elements of a 
right, given the different obligations it can imply. As will become clear, 
when I set out the two different types of duty, adjudicating what it means 
to act on these two types of duties or to breach them amounts to very 
different things, implying very different tests.
The distinction I have in mind is between a) obligations that require us 
to rule out specific considerations for treating people in a certain way, such 
1  The Civil & Politial v Economic & Social distinction is a de facto description of 
rights appearing in different instruments of the UN Bill of Rights (ICCPR v ICESCR); liberty 
v goods and benefits rights is a terminology introduced by Onora O’Neill (1996:131 ff.); 
Negative v Positive rights are discussed in (Bedau 1979); and positive v negative duties later 
by Shue (1996: 35 ff.); other attempts to distinguish human rights that are thought genuine 
from those that are not include the justiciable versus non-justiciable distinction, Justice 
Sachs (2000); see also Christiansen (2007).
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as the obligation not to consider Jane’s skin color when deciding whether 
she should be permitted to enter a shop or the obligation not to take 
political expediency as a relevant consideration to whether political 
opponents should be silenced; and b) an obligation to give some weight to 
different interests people have in enjoying certain conditions and those 
interests of the individuals who must carry burdens to create such 
conditions. For example, we must weigh the interest Jane has in seeing 
certain improved access to health care secured versus the interests of other 
members of Jane’s society in not facing significantly-increasing tax 
burdens, as these will impact on their abilities to pursue their own personal 
life projects.2 Both types of interest matter, so to resolve how much health 
provision Jane is entitled to have we need to know how to weigh them 
against each other – that is, we need an index.
Consider an example. In 2015, the government of Greece was criticized 
review of the Committee for Economic Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) 
of the UN for failings in its EcoSoc rights provisions, such as basic health 
provisions (CESCR 2015: e.g., paras. 19 & 20). Specifically, provision of 
health resources and access to them had been curtailed by government 
policy during an economic emergency, principally reflected in a sovereign 
debt crisis. The Greek government responded that it did not have the 
resources to keep those EcoSoc provisions at the prior level given the 
conflicting priority of floating the economy. Critics of Greece point out 
that it had options as to where to find resources to address the crisis: health 
provision was not the only one. It could have increased taxation of the 
affluent instead as a concrete response that is more specific than the 
CESCR’s chide that the government could “do more”. However, a question 
arises as to what the right way to understand the duty to fulfil the right 
might be, in terms of how burdens can be allocated to resource that 
provision without being unreasonable (imposing unacceptable levels of 
burden). Answering that question, I will argue, requires us to adopt the 
second model of obligations (b) above in that it calls for an index in 
weighing different and conflicting interests none of which are disqualified 
as irrelevant considerations to what we should do. That is a different 
question from the categorical one of whether the Greek government was 
appealing to unacceptable, irrelevant considerations, in distributing 
burdens the way it did. 
In part 2 below, I set out this distinction in types of duties more clearly. 
2  Throughout this paper I refer to “duties” and “justified burdens” as comprising 
the costs that people may have to shoulder to secure the satisfaction of certain interests for 
others. Duties are just one type of burden, whereas lost opportunities (opportunity costs) 
involving no obligatory action are another, thus the need to specify both elements. I also use 
duty and obligation interchangeably.
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In 3, I focus on the second obligations model, underpinned as it is by 
reasons relating to how one should weigh competing but legitimate 
interests and which I call ‘Weighing reasons’. In 4 I return to the other 
model of obligations, those based in what I call ‘Decisive reasons’. In 5 I 
show why some key objections to this distinction between the two models 
and its application to human rights duties do not work. 
2. THE DISTINCTION
Another way to frame the distinction among types of duties I have in mind 
is in terms of reasons and actions.3 On the one hand, we consider a specific 
action type in terms of the considerations for it and whether there are 
reasons to rule out those considerations – and with them the action. This 
might also work with omissions where a specific action should not be 
omitted for certain considerations.4 The government omitting to distribute 
food aid because it does not want to develop an aid plan for the poor, viz. 
poor citizens will not generally bring electoral dividends, makes it 
wrongfully neglectful of those citizens. In such cases, we have reasons to 
rule out the consideration, the electoral calculations, supporting the 
omission and with it the omission itself.5 However, ruling out omissions 
requires ruling out the positive considerations entertained in favor of 
wrongfully omitting the action. On the other hand, we have reasons to give 
a certain weight to some considerations when determining what action 
should be carried out, given the different competing considerations. The 
proposal to increase contributions towards educational provision must be 
considered by weighing the benefits the provision brings to those who can 
access it against what it requires in burdens for those who must, say, be 
taxed to finance it. We do not have a categorical reason to provide a given 
amount of education for any person, in this case, until we have found a 
3  For one theorist, a practical reason is something “that counts in favour of some 
attitude or action” (Scanlon 2004: 231). For clarity in the text when referring to “reasons” I 
shall exclusively be referring to obligation-generating moral considerations, and by 
“considerations” I shall mean any candidate reasons (in Scanlon’s sense), moral or non-
moral, for acting or omitting to act.
4  I make no fundamental distinction between actions and omissions (the failure to 
perform a given action) in this paper. One can have an obligation to perform specific actions 
as well as an obligation not to perform certain specific actions (to omit).
5  The idea that there are special moral reasons that indicate considerations we can 
disqualify or exclude as reasons in moral deliberation is present in a number of authors 
(Dworkin 1984; Waldron 2000: 302 ff.; Dworkin 2010: 330). Scanlon identifies a special brand 
of ‘complex reasons’: those reasons we have to not take certain other considerations into 
account. These can include reasons not to weigh or promote a given aim (Scanlon 1998: 50 
ff.). The general idea that moral reasons can ‘silence’ other considerations is present in John 
McDowell (1998, originally published in 1978: see 92).
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justified way to weigh the different interests against each other and arrived 
at the amount that is mandated by this weighing.
We can call the first kind of reasons “Decisive”:
Decisive: No considerations within a range, R, such as considerations a, 
b, or c, etc., is admitted as a (pro tanto) reason in deciding how to treat 
someone. Actions based on those considerations are ruled out.
Considerations can here include people’s interests, which can be 
disqualified as having no weight in our deliberations. For example, consider 
a state claiming an interest for itself or its citizens in allowing slavery to 
take place. That interest should be given no weight because it demeans and 
diminishes human beings, treating them as objects of ownership. Weighing 
the interests of one group (the slavers) versus another (the potential 
victims) is itself decisively ruled out because of what the pro-slavery 
interest implies about other human beings.6
Where we have reason to weigh interests against each other, we can call 
this “Weighing”:
Weighing: For a range of beneficial outcomes O that persons might 
enjoy, such as p, q, r, etc., the securing of which depends on others 
persons limiting their enjoyment of a range of outcomes, S, such as t, u, 
v, etc., we must assign a certain weight to these outcomes such that we 
know how much curtailment of S-type outcomes it is justified to assign 
to those that will experience the curtailment, given the O-type outcomes 
this will produce.
Simply, “Weighing” assigns obligations according to some idea of 
appropriate weighing and balancing between certain benefits for persons 
and those burdens required to produce/secure the benefits. I will come to 
what such weighing amounts to and how it might be done below. For now, 
consider that the fact that we can increase street lighting by 50%, and with 
it personal security by 5%, does not by itself tell us whether we should do 
so. First, we must look at the costs, in terms of lost opportunities or 
outcomes to others. A proposal to reduce road traffic speed limits down to 
20mph on all roads, even if it improves safety outcomes gained, has to be 
weighed against the losses it would bring in many other areas of life; and 
that weighing, done right, might indicate that a global 20mph speed limit 
6  By “interest” here I mean an element of people’s wellbeing, in the sense of what 
does or can make their lives go better if satisfied. Some theorists claim that one cannot have 
an interest in unjust things, and that is why some “interests” do not count for the purpose of 
grounding rights (Tasioulas 2015: 49). However, if we are justifying human rights this would 
be circular, appealing to a right (justice) to explain a right. Not only that, there is an 
important sense in which interests relate to a person’s life plans, even mistaken life plans, 
rather than what is good per se.
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constitutes too much of a loss in ways that matter for people’s lives, even if 
it would avoid a certain amount of death-risk on the roads. The weighing 
must be done to determine what we should do. We would not, however, 
accept similar reasoning when considering killing of one’s unhelpful boss, 
say, such that we weigh the benefits to us against her personal losses, assign 
weights to each on some scale, and then calculate what to do. Rather, 
entertaining that very calculation smacks of psychopathy – we have a 
compelling reason not to treat such considerations as operative reasons at 
all, because treating people as part of such a calculation is excluded by 
their status as persons. Secondly, where weighing is appropriate we need 
to introduce a way to weigh the securing of this range of people’s interests 
given the costs of doing so to others. That might be done by introducing a 
certain index to do this weighing, such as that for every gain X, a certain 
amount or type of cost Y is acceptable for others, but no more. I will shortly 
come to how to weigh.
Weighing reasons allow both that the amount of provision towards 
satisfying a given interest for each person is determined according to the 
fair burdens that can be imposed on others in providing it. It might also 
allow that the numbers of persons having access to that provision are also 
limited, according to the fairness of the required burdens, as where people 
in the worst conditions are prioritized given what can fairly be imposed in 
the form of taxes at a certain juncture. Fairness is a value that itself needs 
setting out, and there are different accounts. Some see fairness as 
equivalent to reciprocity, others to focusing on the least well-off.7 For now, 
I am using it to indicate what burdens people may be expected to accept 
given the benefits, where no reason exists to cancel out the burdens as a 
valid consideration in deciding the correct course of action. The question 
of how we should weigh costs against benefits works along both axes 
(individual provision/numbers of individuals provided for). I will leave 
open the question as to along which axis balancing is permitted, in the 
sense set out above. If one accepts a basic equality restriction that no 
person can receive less provision than any other – which would require a 
special justification – then only one kind of balancing will be permitted. I 
am also leaving aside the question of weighing or deciding what to do when 
rights themselves (as opposed to the interests underpinning rights 
claims) clash. For my case that two types of reasons exist it is enough that 
7  Whilst Rawlsian fairness may have started out as Hartian reciprocity, it is not clear 
that Rawls’ theory of distributive justice, and especially his “difference principle”, is a 
reciprocal version of fairness. The original position models fairness in terms of what people 
would reasonably accept as a potential outcome for them: “…the idea of fair terms of 
cooperation: these are terms each participant may reasonably accept, and sometimes 
should accept, provided that everyone else likewise accepts them.” (Rawls 2001: 6).
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sometimes we must weigh competing interests and sometimes competing 
interests are silenced.
Decisive reasons are pro tanto moral reasons or obligations. That is, 
there may be circumstances where one is forced by other moral reasons or 
obligations to go against these reasons. That would not, however, be a case 
where the reasons were extinguished. So, suppose a police officer was 
forced to act in a racially discriminatory way in order to prevent a murder 
(thus mollifying the murderer until backup arrived): that would not render 
the reasons to not racially discriminate invalid in such a case. There are 
other overriding reasons all-things-considered take priority in these 
circumstances. This is important because the mere existence of potentially 
overriding reasons all-things-considered, as in the above example, does 
not turn all Decisive reasons into Weighing reasons. That would be the 
case if Weighing reasons were only, or principally, triggered where we had 
to adjudicate between pro tanto obligations. But Weighing reasons exist 
where no pro tanto moral obligations exist, mandating us to act, but where 
valid considerations are nevertheless weighed and balanced. No obligation 
survives this balancing or weighing, all-things-considered, and we wrong 
no one by fairly adjudicating between the competing interests. Thus, 
consider the benefits of university education and the cost of taxes to 
provide it. If we decide on a certain amount of taxation, and resulting 
university provision is acceptable, we are not thereby deciding to breach a 
pre-existing pro tanto moral reason not to tax. The question of whether we 
should tax or not is always posed in relation to the benefits that might be 
derived from taxation. The interests people may have against taxing at this 
level may be outweighed by the interests in university provision. In which 
case, we would have a resulting reason to tax, which is a pro tanto reason, 
not a group of separate pro tanto reasons.
The focus on disqualifying considerations in Decisive reasoning may 
be thought to imply that reasoning is wholly about intentions, versus the 
objective features of the actions themselves; indeed that has been raised as 
an objection to one version of this approach (Möler 2009: 762 ff.). The 
objection poses a dilemma: either we focus on subjective states in pursuing 
an action or we focus on objective reasons of the action. Focusing on 
subjective states is problematic because we may be unable to determine 
them, and part of what one can acceptably intend will anyway depend on 
what an action objectively does – intentions deriving their moral 
acceptability form the actions they intend. Focusing on objective effects, 
however, will focus on how interests are affected and that goes beyond the 
specific reasons the agent may have for carrying out the action. For my 
purposes, here we can refuse the dilemma. The objection runs together 
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“intention behind” with “reasons for”. We can consider what can best 
explain the action in its context in terms of the considerations that might 
support it, the reasons for it, and decide from those if any could plausibly 
render the action permissible because they are not disqualified 
considerations but genuine reasons. Indeed, some types of action are 
already differentiated by their inherent incorporation of a certain kind of 
purpose that can never be an acceptable consideration for acting. The 
action of enslaving a person inherently incorporates extreme purposes 
with regard to human instrumentalization such that they cannot be 
divorced from a proper interpretation of the action. Below I will identify 
the kind of moral basis one might cite to exclude reasons of this kind; but 
for now, we can see that it is not the subjective intention, but the publicly 
defensible interpretation of an action and its plausible supporting reasons 
that matters for Decisive reasons.
Now, it might be objected here that there are moral theories that not 
only permit weighing, but endorse it, in all cases, meaning the cases I have 
described as Decisive are only ever provisionally decisive. Some forms of 
consequentialism, such as those incorporating an unconstrained 
wellbeing-maximizing instruction, might indeed assign weights to the 
option of murdering my boss, as well as reducing speed limits on the road. 
They arrive at both conclusions about what can or should be done by 
weighing. A significant attraction in rights thinking, however, which is 
also present in the aspirations for human rights standards, is to limit that 
kind of reasoning. Rights are seen variously as limits, side constraints, or 
as invoking interests that are “qualitatively” different from other interests 
that can be simply weighed against each other.8 How, or why, such 
qualitative limits exist depends on one’s theory of individual-centered 
imperatives, but one thing any such theory would need to do is explain 
certain considerations as peremptory, such that certain considerations, 
including those relating to satisfying other people’s interests, cannot count 
against them even in very large numbers. To do that, those other 
considerations must have a weighting of zero in confrontations with these 
interests. Examples of such, pro tanto, weightless considerations would be 
justifying the political exclusion of others on the basis of race or the 
sacrifice a person’s life on the grounds that it brings satisfaction in terms of 
(whatever number of) other people’s life projects. To be able to do this, we 
need a reason to set the relevant considerations to zero in these 
confrontations, and that kind of reason needs explaining beyond an appeal 
to an unexplained terminology of qualitative differences between 
8  For latter see Waldron (1989: e.g., pp. 509, 512, & 519).
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interests.9 If one accepts that there are such rights, then one needs that 
reason-based explanation.
Now, if this is right, it means that, whilst Decisive reasons focus on what 
counts as an acceptable consideration for an action (or omission), Weighing 
reasons are index-focused. They concern what should be weighed against 
what and on what basis, as an index for negotiating between different and 
valid competing interests, in order to arrive at normative conclusions 
about what can or should happen.
Decisive reasons are more straightforward. Key human rights or basic 
rights include rights not to be arbitrarily detained, arbitrarily killed, 
tortured, or enslaved, for example.10 It is important to note that what is 
ruled out by such rights relates to certain types of treatment, distinguishable 
not simply by the interests that they affect, but also by the basis for the 
treatment. We must not simply look at the impact on certain interests of 
being detained to determine whether it is morally acceptable, but must 
also consider whether it is arbitrary: meaning there is no compelling 
reason for it. If the non-arbitrariness test is passed, then detention can be 
permissible. It is also possible that negative impacts on interests such as 
one’s interest in being free from coercive force, from having one’s bodily 
integrity attacked, or from having one’s life threatened are not by 
themselves the basis for ruling out certain actions. Killing in self-defense, 
forcibly coercing a detainee to prevent them carrying out a crime or from 
escaping justice, would both seem to be compatible with human rights 
standards. Killing for personal advantage, coercing someone with the aim 
of convenience, interfering with bodily integrity for material advantage or 
for no good reason, are all ruled out. With some human rights, the 
disqualified purpose is already built-into the description of the right. So, 
torture incorporates the purpose of using attacks on a person’s wellbeing 
(infliction of grave pain) to either break their resolve in order to extract 
something from them against their prior conviction, such as information, 
punish them, or enjoy their suffering. Slavery incorporates the notion of 
ownership or control such that one person’s exercise of her will in directing 
her life and person is subordinated to the aims of another. The attack on 
the interests in question, on being free from pain or being free from 
restraint or free to do as one wishes, is not by itself obviously prohibited. 
One might legitimately apply very serious pain to prevent an attacker 
harming another person, and that would not constitute a violation of a 
9  Waldron, for example, never explains the notion of ‘qualitatively’ different 
interests that he takes to underpin rights (op cit).
10  These are clear core candidates for moral human rights, also reflected in 
international instruments (viz. ICCPR 1966/1978: Arts. 9, 6, 7, 8).
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human right, even pro tanto. This indicates that it is the way that interests 
are attacked – on the basis of what consideration or purpose that this is 
done – that determines the acceptability of the actions.
Here, one could object that the interest in question is the interest in 
being free from slavery, for example, such that it is an attack on these and 
not the considerations behind the attack that matters. That way, the effect 
on interests, and not the reasons behind the action affecting them is what 
matters in explaining human rights obligations. But not only is this an ad 
hoc move, introducing sui generis interests identified by type of treatment; 
this response still needs to explain why some interests are special, in the 
sense of being capable of disqualifying other considerations and not 
merely outweighing them. The slave owner’s interest in holding slaves 
should have a weight of zero in deliberating on what to do if many slave 
owners are not to skew the figures on whether slavery is acceptable. In 
which case, we need a reason to disqualify them and the interest taken on 
its own will not explain that reason.
It is worth emphasizing here that Decisive reasons do not only exclude 
actions. Their focus is on disqualifying certain types of considerations as 
relevant to deciding how to act. They can also disqualify consideration 
that apply to omissions – as when a government neglects the safety of its 
citizens. Decisive reasons cut across negative-positive rights or even 
negative-positive duties distinctions because they are reasons to disqualify 
considerations; and they rule out actions or omissions in so far as they are 
supported by disqualified considerations. These can include considerations 
that fail to sufficiently take into account the effect of a policy on citizens, 
and thereby imply neglect of their interests. Decisive reasons do not only 
apply to CivPol rights as traditionally understood. They can apply to 
considerations in the way EcoSoc rights are distributed. A state that 
prevents Jay from accessing a hospital because of her race or gender, where 
the hospital is not dedicated to group-specific ailments, will thereby 
breach a Decisive reason. Such considerations are disqualified when 
determining how to distribute social goods. What Decisive reasons cannot 
tell us is how to fairly determine the balance between interests, benefits 
and burdens when weighing these is appropriate, and consequently how 
much of a given social good is to be provided. That question concerns the 
correct index for weighing these interests against each other in determining 
what to do, implying a different kind of moral consideration.
Weighing reasons are more complex because considerations against 
providing certain outcomes for people can include interests that are not 
easily dismissed or disqualified as inherently invalid, yet do not themselves 
ground decisive reasons. So, for example, the human right to health or 
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education are often taken as entitling people to fulfilment in the form of a 
certain amount of benefit provision in these categories of (health and 
education) interest (CESCR 1999b: s. 47; CESCR 2000: ss. 33, 36, 37, & 44; 
Also Bilchitz 2007: 195). But it cannot be the case that a person has a claim 
against grounding an unconditional duty for others to provide N amount 
of health provision or N* amount of educational provision, given that 
providing these requires those others to take on burdens to do so that 
would represent personal costs in pursuing life aims. Consider a level of 
resource requirement, n, needed to achieve educational provision N, that 
imposes on fellow citizens a duty to give up pursuing any personal life 
aims not dedicated to advancing n, but instead to adopt life-shaping aims 
around achieving n. They would have to decide their career choices and 
personal goals in terms of a personal commitment to what better achieves 
n. Achieving n might require citizens to further restrict their personal 
lives, limiting their friendships in number so as to maximize resource and 
time towards contribution. Untrammeled, obligatory dedication to n 
would reach deep into their lives as separate persons that would otherwise 
be guided by a sense of their own projects and pursuits. These requirements 
are unreasonable in the sense of undermining one of the points of a liberal 
and egalitarian morality: individuals living the lives according to their 
values and best lights. Unlimited instrumentalization should be an 
unreasonable demand, even for egalitarians.11 So, we need some clear 
sense of the limits of reasonableness. Whilst many authors mention 
reasonableness as a limit, or concede that no “excessive”, “unreasonable”, 
or “overly burdensome” requirements can be expected, these views always 
leave the criteria for reasonableness or excessiveness un-specified. Nor do 
they even supply a decision-procedure or principle that we might use to 
arrive at such an answer.12
In addition to reasonableness problems, there are also matters of 
fairness. Demanding large contributions from some citizens, even if these 
demands are consistent with allowing them to choose and pursue personal 
11  In the words of G. A. Cohen, they would turn each person into an “engine for the 
welfare of other people” or “slaves to social justice”. Cohen says that this requirement would 
be “excluded by a legitimate personal prerogative [that] grants each person the right to be 
something other” than this (Cohen 2008: 10). 
12  Viz. whilst Cohen, supra, accepts a balance between other-regarding contributions 
and a personal prerogative (11), but gives no indication on how to determine the proper and 
just balance between the two (other than to claim we intuitively understand it [6 ff. and 354 
ff.]). Other examples of accepting limits but giving no account include Buchanan (2004: 89, 
92, 94 n.8), Stemplowska, who concedes duties to provide resources apply “if such resources 
can be provided at a reasonable cost to the provider”(Stemplowska 2009: 468), and Gilabert, 
who also acknowledges there are limits to contribution but gives no account of those limits 
(Gilabert 2012: 47).
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aims, can still be unfair. That is because one can ask whether allowing the 
burdens to fall unevenly on some citizens treats those citizens with equal 
concern. Allowing some citizens more opportunities, or fewer burdens, to 
exercise their capacity to pursue their personal goals means treating them 
differently, and the differences have consequences for how they can pursue 
distinct lives. The need for fairness requires a positive account of how 
interests – both basic ones and those in pursuing distinct lives – can be 
balanced so that citizens are treated with equal concern, and thus fairly. 
An account of how to weigh interests fairly is, however, different from an 
account that disqualifies certain considerations for action. 
Of course, there may be circumstances where fairness considerations 
are not pertinent. It might be argued that one ought to save a drowning 
child, even if one has saved many such children recently – just because one 
is confronted with the drowning child. Introducing fairness here is out of 
place. However, what precisely matters about the interests in play in the 
cases I have identified is that they are not rescue cases triggered by special 
circumstances of direct confrontation with the jeopardy of specific 
sufferers. Rescue cases are most plausible when considerations relating to 
a reasonable dispensation to prioritize one’s own aims to guide one’s life 
are absent, and so are considerations focused on the fair distribution of 
opportunities to pursue one’s life aims. This is reflected in the number of 
authors working on rescue that look for characteristics to demarcate these 
cases in terms of the specificity of the circumstances – such as “being 
confronted” with another’s plight, or being in the “proximity” of someone 
in peril.13 Certainly, any attempt to generalize from the mere fact that 
someone lacks basic interest satisfaction in a specific rescue case to a duty 
to contribute to basic interest satisfaction for all who need it, will introduce 
the need for a Weighing reasons model.
3. ACCOUNTS OF WEIGHING REASONS
If my above analysis is correct, then there are two types of duties, and two 
types of reasons that underpin them, corresponding to human rights 
standards. The point of this distinction is not to reject either type of duty 
but rather to invite reflection on what these duties demand, in the form of 
theories that give them content. The distinction is also not intended to rule 
out either duty model as relevant to human rights, in the way that perhaps 
debates on whether human rights are (technically) rights are intended to 
13  What triggers rescue duties is a matter of dispute. A number of theorists propose 
proximity, (Miller 2010: 23 ff.; Kamm 2007: 379) while others focus on ‘confrontation’ with a 
specific person’s case (Dworkin 2010: 277 ff.) as the defining feature.
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do (Cranston 1973; Bedau 1979). I deal with the question of whether this 
disjunctive analysis challenges the status of human rights as rights below. 
For now, if there are genuine Decisive and Weighing reasons, then they will 
generate obligations. Given the nature of the two types of claims, and any 
one human right will need both types of reasons and obligations to give it 
a well-articulated content.
By introducing the complexity of types of duty and the reasons that 
underpin them I also introduce some necessary complexity in our 
understanding how human rights can or should be claimed. Where the 
matter is simply one of Decisive reasoning, certain actions or omissions 
are categorically ruled out because of the character of the considerations 
that support them. Where Weighing reasons are appropriate, adjudication 
will need more information about what it would take to provide different 
levels of provision, and it will also need a principle for weighing the 
provision against the cost. This can only mean that an account of 
distributive justice is required.
For states seeking to comply in a principled way with their human rights 
obligations, determining a principled (reasonable and fair) way to carry 
out this balancing will be indispensable. That involves having a clear sense 
of what fairness can demand, in the form of a justifiable principle of fair 
distribution of benefits and burdens (a principle of distributive justice). 
Whilst there is little or no literature on fairness for human rights, the 
literature for principles of distributive justice is much richer and more 
advanced.
A rare exception to the lack of attention to, or even recognition of, this 
problem in human rights literature is David Bilchitz, who argues that we 
should accept a “core obligations” model prioritizing certain demands for 
fulfilment of interests, and progressive taxation as a means to resource the 
provisions (Bilchitz 2007: 88-89). Bilchitz’s basic idea is that the more 
wealth people have, the more diminished are the returns on that wealth as 
utility for those that enjoy it (ibid). Thus, requiring contributions from 
those with more wealth is a less demanding (and a more marginal) burden 
than from those at other income levels. This, he argues, supports a 
progressive taxation solution to the supply question. But, whilst it is 
commendable that Bilchitz at least recognizes that there is a problem to be 
addressed, his response does not solve it.
While the response explains where to prioritize contributions, it either 
fails to explain what constitutes a fair contribution or it implies an 
implausible account of fairness. To take contributions at the margin – i.e., 
from the better-off first – does not indicate any limit on how much should 
be contributed. It is possible, on this instruction, to simply keep on taking. 
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If there is no limit with an accompanying justification, then this not an 
account of fair contribution so much as an account of the order in which to 
collect contributions. One could come up with a limit, say of a certain level 
of wealth, but that would require justification as the right account of fair 
cost distribution. It would also imply that taking more was wrong, because 
unfair, and correspondingly right holders could only claim what was 
achievable with this level of contribution. Bilchitz does not supply an 
account of this kind of fairness. But we can consider some alternatives.
Perhaps, implicit in the progressive tax idea is the view that people must 
contribute up to that point where their own rights are threatened. That is, 
they are allowed to keep enough resources to be marginally above basic 
interest satisfaction. However, it is unclear why that is what constitutes a 
fair contribution. Bilchitz himself focuses on basic interests as setting a 
threshold of ‘core obligations’ for EcoSoc human rights.14 But that threshold 
seems too low to act as the bottom limit to which contributions can 
acceptably take a contributor, as a matter of fairness – it gives little or no 
weight to the value of respecting people developing and pursuing distinct 
life-shaping aims. It would imply that where some people were below the 
threshold because of a deficit in resources, potential contributors would 
always forfeit opportunities to personally work towards obtaining 
resources to advance their life-shaping projects and aims. This seems to 
rule out the prospect of pursuing a meaningful life through one’s work and 
effort. It yokes the life of each individual, in the sense of developing and 
pursuing projects and goals that are one’s own, to the sole aim of achieving 
a certain wellbeing level for others. Of course, the claim is not that people 
have unlimited rights to this pursuit, it is rather that it should have some 
fair weight.
It is important to parse out the issues here. There is a level of treatment 
for people that is prohibited, and would be covered by an account of 
Decisive reasons. That does not set a level of provision or contribution, 
except in so far as it rules out certain considerations (including some 
considerations about contribution or cost) as relevant to provision. When 
considering behavior such as the enslavement of others, cost considerations 
14  Bilchitz defines minimum core in terms of interest fulfilment that secures near 
bare survival (Bilchitz 2007: 221). It is worth noting that Bilchitz distinguishes implementation 
duties, what he calls “unconditional rights”, from the content of the rights themselves, 
which he calls “conditional rights” because their requirements being categorical depends 
on context and resources (77 ff. & 220 ff.). The latter, somehow, symbolically go beyond what 
is required at any one time by unconditional rights. This distinction is troubling in my view, 
given that the normative content of a right is precisely a matter of what can justifiably be 
demanded from others, and a right considered distinctly from its normative content seems 
a mysterious idea. However, in this paper I am only concerned with the justification of types 
of duty.
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(of spurning slavery) to those doing the enslaving are irrelevant. However, 
when considering Weighing reasons, we must find a way to balance 
interests and determine fair limits for those contributing towards the 
fulfilment of human rights. The limits here are not the same as in Decisive 
reasons – they are not set as limits on the kind of considerations that can 
count, but by deciding how much of one set of acceptable interests it is fair 
to give up for another set – and so what can fairly be expected of contributors. 
However, the proposal that we should set the limits on contribution at the 
point at which “basic” or “core” interests are affected indicates that no one 
has a right to pursue a distinct life of their own so long as they can 
contribute more towards others reaching the satisfaction of those basic 
or core interests, however many people may be in that position. Here, 
reasonableness can still be preserved by not requiring people to prioritize 
the project of contributing to the raising of each and everyone’s wellbeing 
levels, as one’s life aim. That would be an illiberal consequence that made 
a person’s conscience and life aims an instrument for the improvement of 
wellbeing. But even avoiding that, it challenges fairness to require each 
potential contributor to limit their pursuit of personal aims (save those 
that benefit overall interest fulfilment) to zero until all others have their 
basic interest satisfaction secured. It means no one is permitted to pursue 
resource opportunities, for their personal goals, that diverge from 
contributing to that goal, which is a challenging conception of fairness 
given that it does not give any weight to the interest in living a distinct life.
One could try to define the baseline differently, so that it captures those 
resources and opportunities needed to live a meaningful life, say. This 
might also solve associated problems, such as that in today’s world the 
above measure of contribution might consign everyone to a life where they 
cannot pursue any aims that require resources above those necessary for 
basic interest satisfaction. People, on that approach, should give up any 
resource that places them above the core interest satisfactions, so long as 
richer people were the first to give up their resources. This is a worrying 
implication. I am assuming that the advantages above basic interest 
satisfaction that people have are not all or even mostly due to exploiting or 
oppressing those below the basic interest satisfaction level, so we are not 
considering those more straightforward cases of just rectification for 
wronging others. In which case, the yoking of individual life opportunities 
solely to the aim of increasing wellbeing for others implies they cannot 
legitimately pursue meaningful purposes of their own.
The only solution to this problem seems to be to allow that the limit on 
contribution is set so it allows enough resources to live a meaningful life. 
But that raises a set of serious problems too. Any attempt at settling an 
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objective definition of a meaningful life that overrides subjective 
conceptions of what people find meaningful, will be illiberal in that it 
demands the state adopts a conception of a meaningful life for all, even 
those that reject the one proposed by the state. One could try to develop a 
conception at such a level of abstraction that it can encompass very many 
conceptions, say by focusing on a certain level of autonomy or reason-
sensitivity in guiding one’s life.15 But such abstract conceptions are 
compatible with a wide variation in life projects and, consequently, a wide 
variation in the resources people should have the opportunity to pursue to 
put towards those goals. The idea of a compelling general conception of a 
meaningful life that inherently sticks to the resources needed to pursue it 
seems implausible. The alternative, of simply taking subjective 
understandings to define a meaningful life, is even less likely to establish a 
specific resource threshold to which they all subscribe.
Of course, in the sphere of debates about distributive justice theory, 
which is effectively where we find ourselves presently, there are views that 
seems to focus on a threshold as the basis for justice. Sufficientarianism 
suggests we can have a threshold of resource distribution where each 
person has “enough”, and permits anyone above that level to have as much 
as they can obtain that is still compatible with everyone having at least as 
much as the threshold.16 Importantly, however, these views do not limit 
sufficiency either to a fixed point, or at the level of basic interest satisfaction. 
The idea is that people should have enough for a decent human life, and 
what that implies can vary and expand depending on one’s social 
circumstances (See Casal 2007: 313 ff. & 323 ff.). If sufficiency views simply 
asserted the threshold of sufficiency as basic interest satisfaction and 
mandated unconditional redistribution down to that, they would offer a 
categorical account of Weighing reasons. But that approach would suffer 
from the very problem to which we are trying to respond – the unfairness 
of yoking everyone’s life aims and opportunities solely to the aim of 
increasing wellbeing up to certain level for everyone. Instead, space for 
pursuing a meaningful life is needed. Sufficientarian views also do not 
seem to offer a useful account of that (see Casal 2007: 313 ff.).
Note that in now considering fair arrangements, and accounts of 
distributive justice, I have departed from the simple rights view justifiable 
on the Decisive reasons model. For fair arrangements, we need a justified 
principle of distribution (within what Decisive reasons permit). That is: we 
are engaged in considering the fairness of different possible principles 
15  E.g., see Sher’s reason-sensitivity view (Sher 1997: esp. Chapts. 3 & 4).
16  E.g., Sufficientarianism in distributive justice (Frankfurt 1987; Crisp 2003) and as 
applied to human rights (Brock 2009: 62 ff.).
108 Saladin Meckled-Garcia 
LEAP 6 (2018)
according to which relevant agencies can arrange benefits and burdens, 
opportunities and obstacles. These are typically defined and pursued 
through the allocation of socially recognized rights and duties to citizens, 
by an agency that can legitimately make such allocations. Societal fairness 
here asks according to what principles should authoritative agents create 
cooperative arrangements between contributors and beneficiaries using 
allocations of rights and duties.17 Where Weighing reasons are appropriate, 
the principles do not mandate outcomes for beneficiaries at all possible 
costs, but instead offer principles for deciding what costs are acceptable in 
exchange for which benefits. The literature on such principles is rich and 
varied, and interestingly it has been significantly ignored by people 
proposing theories of human rights. Yet, as we now see, if Weighing reasons 
do characterize the content of well-known human rights duties, such as 
duties to fulfil, addressing the problem of how to weigh interests is 
unavoidable. I will consider some arguments for avoiding that model 
below. For now, I look at the implications of treating this as part of 
distributive societal justice theory.
A significant category of principles of distributive justice address the 
above problem of a fair opportunity to pursue a meaningful life, even 
whilst redistributing to assist those who have less opportunities. Some of 
these views allow certain freedoms and opportunities to pursue increased 
access to resources, but conditionally. People can pursue and achieve 
certain personal, resource-requiring goals on the condition that these 
opportunities and achievements are simultaneously of benefit to people 
with less opportunities to pursue resources for their own aims. These 
views differ from proposals that require contributions up to the point in 
which contributors’ own basic interests will cease to be satisfied because 
the latter exclude people pursuing additional resources over and above 
the basic threshold. Conditional opportunity theories condition the 
opportunity to pursue such aims including by pursuing resources on their 
simultaneously contributing to the social good. So, opportunities to pursue 
extra resources towards advancing a musical or artistic project would only 
be permitted in so far as these pursuits also contribute to social benefits 
– in the form of redistribution of a component of their resources. For 
example, a Rawlsian maximin principle requires social institutions to 
permit people to pursue inequality-producing resource aims, but only 
17  I am not here limiting distributive justice to these institutional considerations, 
but rather stating an important role that distributive justice must play, and indeed does in 
the accounts of theorists as varied as Rawls, Dworkin, and G. A. Cohen. For an extensive 
discussion of the distinctive role of the concept of distributive justice see (Meckled-Garcia 
2016).
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where this helps the least advantaged in society.18 Similarly, Dworkin’s 
account of justice as equal concern, and in turn of societal equal concern 
as equality of resources, allows people to pursue distinct life projects so 
long as society aims to guarantee equal starting resources for all to pursue 
their projects, and everyone who can, contributes to social insurance for 
those that might meet difficult resource circumstances (Dworkin, 2000: 
pp. 73 ff.).
Accepting that some human rights duties or justified Weighing reasons 
must apply, has the upshot that whilst the principles for weighing different 
interests will remain the same, their application will vary according to 
which interests are in play to be weighed against each other in any one 
context. Fairness demands different things where pursuit of a personal 
end will simultaneously contribute to the social good compared to where 
that pursuit has no social dividend. The principle is the same in both cases, 
but the interest distribution and relation differs. With Decisive reasons, 
one is not relating interests that might differ but rather determining what 
kind of considerations are acceptable or relevant to a course of action. 
Moral reasons should be able to rule out a range of these a priori, and with 
them the actions they support. Distributive justice principles, because of 
their conformity to the Weighing reasons model, do not have this a priori 
consideration and action-focused component.
Of course, here I do not propose to support or advance any one theory of 
distributive justice. A whole range of candidate principles exist in the 
literature that try to answer the fairness problem, including utilitarian, 
egalitarian, prioritarian, and sufficientarian views. Some function by 
introducing more specific opportunity-focused, resources-focused, welfare-
focused, access-to-welfare-focused, maximin-focused, etc., frameworks. For 
my purposes, it is only necessary to highlight that the kind of distributional 
problem best framed in terms of Weighing reasons is already recognized 
by a significant body of literature. That literature recognizes different 
facets that matter to distributive justice – including personal responsibility 
for opportunities, the significance of choices and abilities, the important 
role of a distributive agency, and the space for pursuing one’s own ends or 
meaningful projects. Yet that literature (and the problems to which it 
responds) are not recognized as core discussions in human rights theory. 
One motivation for this might be the belief that human rights do not engage 
with Weighing reasons but rather with categorical requirements. I consider 
arguments for this below.
18  Rawls’ maximin principle is described in his Theory of Justice (revised edition) 
(Rawls 1999: 72); some critiques of this view have questioned this permission as un-justified 
(Cohen 2008: 151 ff.).
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For now, if human rights obligations include both Weighing reasons 
and Decisive reasons, then these must be parsed out when deliberating 
over the content of people’s entitlements as a matter of right. To give 
content to obligations that engage Weighing reasons, some account of 
distributive fairness will be crucial.19 Bilchitz’s (unsuccessful) attempt to 
provide such an account highlights that we need this kind of framework in 
settling the content of some human rights duties, such as those to fulfil. 
So, returning to the example of the Greek government, taxing affluent 
people is perfectly justified to protect crucial health provisions for the 
most vulnerable in society. A variety of principles of distributive fairness 
might support this. A maximin principle would say that where the wealth 
of the affluent does not improve the condition of the worst off, and the 
simple existence of affluent people did not do that for health in Greece, 
contributions must be made by those who have greater advantages, but 
opportunities to pursue resources are nevertheless permitted only as long 
as pursuing them brings dividends to the least advantaged. There are no 
limits on what can be pursued that has this characteristic and taxation 
must not make the beneficial opportunities impossible. If, on the other 
hand, one were obliged to fulfil others’ basic interests at whatever cost, 
globally, allowing people to pursue additional resources would be ruled 
out, as they can be expected to work to fulfil global basic interests regardless 
of any opportunity to obtain resources for their aims (Cf. Cohen 2008: n. 
10). Treating human rights duties as unconditional requirements to fulfil 
basic interests misses this complexity.
If the above is right, then when resolving the duty content of rights and 
adjudicating specific cases, we need to be aware of the different kinds of 
reasons that it makes sense to take into account. Trying to apply Decisive 
reasoning where Weighing reasons are appropriate will create problems of 
resource and contribution sensitivity that Decisive reasons do not tell us 
how to solve. Treating human rights as generating categorical obligations 
also hides these differences leading to similar tangles. International 
standards recognize the need for resource sensitivity, as we shall soon see, 
but supply no principle for adjudicating these questions. When duty 
bearers appeal to lack of resources in fulfilling a right, a compelling 
response will need to appeal to a fair principle of distribution.
Weighing reasons are important for fulfilment duties because Decisive 
reasons give no positive account of how much of any important provision 
or benefit people must supply. To be pertinent in any context, we must be 
19  Some theorists see human rights as a subset of justice, and distributive justice as 
on a par. They thus miss the possibility of these different types of duty and the different 
consequences of applying them (e.g., Tasioulas 2010: 654 ff. & 659).
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faced with valuable aims, in the form of interests that matter for persons, 
as well as countervailing, though legitimate, considerations in the form of 
the aims and pursuits of those who would have to forego those 
pursuits to satisfy the valuable aims. Those two models of reasoning 
about considerations are pertinent to duties corresponding to both CivPol 
and EcoSoc rights. There is a difference between discriminatory or even 
neglectful considerations in deciding how police protections are to be 
distributed, and the question of how much police protection everyone 
should have, given the costs in a particular social context. The pertinence 
of both types of reasoning is as true of police protection budgets as of the 
decision over how many dialysis facilities a society should have.
4. DECISIVE REASONS
Whilst I have given some examples, I have not set out a general account of 
the kind of moral consideration that can constitute a Decisive reason in 
the sphere of human rights. These are reasons to disqualify a given range 
of considerations as relevant to how a person should be treated – thus also 
ruling out a Weighing reasons type deliberation on the basis of these 
considerations. That a person has important interests is not sufficient to 
establish reasoning as to the relevance or irrelevance of a consideration 
because that importance does not explain the kind of categorical 
decisiveness that can disqualify a consideration. The importance of an 
interest might, under certain circumstances, simply outweigh other 
interest considerations, depending on the numbers of interests in play. 
Thus, the need to improve road safety can outweigh road users’ interests in 
efficient travel. However, to rule out or disqualify some considerations as 
relevant to how we ought to treat a person, we need reasons or values that 
are categorically superior so that other considerations do not count against 
them. That must be the case however many considerations of the 
disqualified kind could be stacked against this value. That an interest is 
important for a person’s wellbeing, even hugely important, does not have 
this categorical character unless one has a special reason to promote it 
categorically. An example of such a consideration might be the inherent 
value in a person being respected in exercising her capacity to adopt goals 
and commitments, to develop these, prioritize amongst them, and to 
pursue them as personal life projects – projects that give direction to and 
shape her life. To value that capacity is to respect it, and to respect it means 
not seeking to usurp its exercise, impose conditions on it exercise, or 
undermine the possibility of its exercise. Failure to respect the sovereign 
exercise of this capacity in persons, for any reason other than upholding 
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this very same respect, is wrongful because it treats their living distinct 
lives as subordinate to aims and priorities that are not their own.
Actions like enslavement and torture are in this way categorically 
wrongful; they disrespect a person as having sovereignty over the exercise 
of this capacity. The actions of slavery subordinate a person’s capacity to 
adopt, prioritize, and pursue her ends to the priorities, and pursuits of the 
slave owner. Torture uses a person’s sense of wellbeing (in her aversion to 
pain) to alter her priorities and commitments – e.g., the commitment not 
to disclose the location of her colleagues, thus subordinating her capacity 
to prioritize and pursue these commitments to the aims of the torturer. 
Imposing pain on someone may under certain circumstances be 
permissible, as in self-defense. There the permission to intervene is not a 
failure to respect self-sovereignty but rather an expression of it: upholding 
that it be respected for others. The value itself sets limits on its own exercise. 
Where the considerations for imposing pain on another or constraining 
her freedom fail to respect this self-sovereignty value, they are discounted 
as having no weight; and the actions they support are ruled out as (pro 
tanto) wrongful. With the race-based exclusion case, mentioned at the 
beginning of this paper, the literature contains a number of theories of 
discrimination and though some of those analyses overlap with this 
question they are not limited to it (Viz., Wasserstrom 1995; Lippert-
Rasmussen 2006; Gardner 2018). But the key question here is the narrower 
one of what kind of reason can not only outweigh, but also disqualify a 
race-based consideration for exclusion? Some accounts focus on the 
demeaning of the target, others on thwarting of a key interest (Hellman 
2008; Moreau 2010). Some views focus on treating groups as less worthy of 
decent treatment (Shin 2009). However, to disqualify the consideration 
itself even as an interest that should be balanced with others in a weighing 
exercise, we simply reflect that it mistakenly uses the characteristic of race 
as grounds to dismiss the value in people exercising their capacity to form, 
develop, prioritize, and pursue commitments as the determinant of how 
they should be treated. The mistake disqualifies the consideration as 
having any weight against treating people in light of the capacity. Where 
countervailing considerations are not open to disqualification in this way, 
but have independent importance as people’s interests, then the Weighing 
reasons model is appropriate.
5. OBJECTIONS
As I mentioned above, the Decisive reasons versus Weighing reasons 
distinction – and certainly the notion of principles of distributive societal 
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justice – are not commonly appealed to as sources for the content of human 
rights standards. One reason for this may be a tendency to treat the analysis 
of duties and justified burdens associated with human rights as categorical 
obligations, meaning they unconditionally demand a certain outcome for 
each person and would thus rule out Weighing reasons as part of their 
analysis. I now respond to some arguments for this view.
5.1. Weighing reasons as Decisive reasons
The first objection is that we can and should re-describe human rights 
duties in categorical terms. In saying people have a right to a certain 
amount of health care we are saying that this is obligatory in some non-
negotiable sense. One way this could be done is by introducing obligations 
that are categorical but worded in a conditional way.20 In fact, the use of 
conditional wording is present in international legal documents associated 
specifically with fulfilling EcoSoc rights.21 The resources and infrastructure 
that should be present to fulfil these rights make the associated duties 
difficult to word unconditionally. Instead, resource sensitivity is introduced 
in the form of a duty to “progressively realize” them. In carrying out 
progressive realization, states are charged with taking all “appropriate 
steps” and employing “all available resources” towards the goal of fulfilling 
these rights.22 Thus, instead of a categorical obligation to supply certain 
outcomes, which would be resource insensitive, we have a duty to move 
towards those outcomes when certain conditions are met, which is thus 
sensitive to the resources that a state has available to it.
A categorical reading of the fulfilment duties associated with EcoSoc 
rights might imply an obligation to supply an outcome O that requires R 
resources. A duty to progressively realize O means that a state at any time t 
only has an obligation to realize O to the extent, nO, that is possible with 
the resources, nR, that the state has available to it at t. There is a firm and 
categorical obligation here; yet it is not the obligation to fulfil the right, 
only to partially fulfil it to the extent, nO, possible at t. The duty to entirely 
fulfil the right, categorically, would only occur at a point t^, where R 
resources were available to it. So, the duty is conditional on resource 
availability at any one time. If this analysis is correct, we should not have 
20  Cf. Bilchitz’s distinction between conditional and unconditional rights, (Bilchitz 
2007: 78 ff.).
21  There is an important inconsistency in that EcoSoc rights are explicitly subject to 
such conditionally in the UN documents, such as General Comments 3, 10, 14 (CESCR 1990; 
1998; 2000) where PolSci rights are not, or at least not systematically, yet protection and 
fulfilment duties associated with the latter clearly should be as I have stressed above.
22  For “appropriate steps” see (CESCR 2000: ss. 11 & 49); for “available resources” see 
(CESCR 1990; 1998; 2000).
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to resort to Weighing reasons to resolve how to resource the provision of 
human rights fulfilment. We can instead re-describe those duties in 
categorical, albeit conditional, terms in terms.
The problem with this response is that the notion of “available 
resources” is being used as a descriptive term, when it could only be a 
normative concept. This is because what counts as “available” for a state to 
use depends on what it can legitimately extract from those who work for or 
within it. This will take the form of taxation, work contributions, or the 
configuring of property relations. Any physical or natural resource will 
need to be turned into exchangeable or useable resources; any already 
exchangeable or useable materials that are owned will need to change 
ownership. That means a state will need to make decisions about 
appropriate levels of taxation, ownership, wealth, property rights, and 
even labor in order to decide what resources are genuinely “available” to it. 
Of course, one could try restricting the notion of available resources to 
what a state has in its possession, or revenue, at any one time, to avoid 
these problems; but that would be an arbitrary choice given the point of 
using these resources. The plausible notion of an available resource will, 
then, depend on the burdens that a state can justifiably impose on people 
leading to benefits for others in terms of basic interest satisfaction. 
Consequently, it is clear that the level at which we set availability depends 
on what citizen contribution level is justified – a moral normative question. 
Some human rights literature takes a step in that direction by appealing to 
the concept of “reasonableness” in assessing what resources are “available” 
(Chenwi, 2013). But no account of reasonableness has been provided to 
address the essential question of how to weigh conflicting interests in 
assigning burdens. This is the Weighing reasons question: at any one time, 
t, what counts as a duty will depend on available resources, which in turn 
depends on the Weighing reasons that apply to the fair social distribution 
of benefits and burdens.
A component of the progressive realization doctrine that might be used 
to try to prescribe categorical requirements for states is the idea that 
EcoSoc rights include “core obligations” associated (CESCR 200: ss. 43 ff.). 
As I have said, my concern here is not with duties associated only with 
EcoSoc rights but with obligations cutting across those kinds of distinctions. 
So, the claim some EcoSoc obligations might be categorical does not 
threaten my analysis of two types of reasons at the heart of human rights 
obligations. However, if the claim is that a scheme for fulfilment provisions 
in which there are certain mandated outcomes is a categorical requirement, 
this does conflict with the view of duties and justified burdens I have 
proposed. The international doctrine associated with core obligations, 
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however, either highlights rights that are easily accounted for as Decisive 
reasons – based on the distinction I have proposed – e.g., that EcoSoc 
services should not be provided in a discriminatory way, or would need to 
be somewhat sensitive to resource availability (Bilchitz 2007: 220 ff.).
5.2. “Rights” versus Weighing reasons?
Some theorists associate human rights with a technical notion of “rights” 
that conceptually implies an entitlement to a specific content – whether it 
is an outcome or form of treatment – that must be known in advance. The 
Weighing reasons analysis does not give us any definite content for the 
entitlement, only for the principle that will be employed to determine it in 
any specific case. So it seems to undermine human rights as rights (see 
Bilchitz’s worry, ibid). In itself, this is not a strong point. For there is no 
reason to think that human rights have to be rights in that very technical 
sense, as opposed to important obligations states have towards their 
citizens.23
A feature more centrally associated with human rights, however, is their 
universality. Some authors interpret this as human rights encompassing 
justified claims that can be claimed by all persons and claimed equally, 
regardless of circumstances or social membership (O’Neill 1996: 130 ff.). 
Onora O’Neill uses this premise to argue that rights to goods and services 
cannot be human rights: to be able to claim them justifiably, and – for the 
purposes of this paper – fairly, one must claim them from a certain 
infrastructure with specific types of responsible agents (O’Neill 1996: 130-
136). Importantly, a state must have fairly allocated the duties to supply the 
content of the rights. However, what exactly a person is entitled to have as 
a matter of fulfilment of their rights, depends on what it is in any given 
context fair to impose as a burden on others. Given that this may differ 
with context, the claim cannot be justifiably and equally made by all 
persons, regardless of circumstances or social membership. That, in turn, 
implies the right is not universal, so that on this view it is not a human 
right.
Yet, this objection does not deny that protection or fulfilment claims 
can ever be justifiably made. It simply says they are not universal in the 
right sense. Institutional orders can be set up such that justifiable, fair, 
claims can be made. So, why is universality, in this particular sense of 
universality, essential to defining human rights? Universality of this 
formal kind is just one dimension that might pick out what is special or 
distinctive in human rights; a different trait might be their importance or 
23  James Griffin, for example, rejects the need to use the technical sense of a right to 
analyze human rights (Griffin 2014: 210).
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urgency, or even their ability to place limits on the legitimacy of political 
institutions. There is no obvious reason why all human rights should apply 
independently of institutional context – in fact, that very condition is 
challenged by “political theories” of human rights (e.g., Beitz’s theory, 
Beitz 2008). Whatever the right answer as to the defining feature/s of 
human rights standards, the claim is not that standards based on Weighing 
reasons, and thus lacking the requisite universality, fail to be normative 
standards at all. If it is admitted that such standards exist and under the 
right conditions they can justify normative claims, then whether we call 
these human rights or not seems more a matter of nomenclature than 
significant substance.
5.3. Does this weaken EcoSoc human rights?
A final objection I will consider is that this approach, with its two models of 
reasoning underpinning different types of obligations, weakens EcoSoc 
human rights claims. EcoSoc rights rely more heavily on fulfilment as their 
core mission. Which is to say that whilst there are cases where taking 
EcoSoc opportunities away – e.g., by intentionally or negligently destroying 
a source of water – is a violation and one consistent with a Decisive reasons 
approach, the key question for EcoSoc rights is how to fulfil certain EcoSoc 
conditions for people. By introducing Weighing reasons, and with them 
the idea that an infrastructure of distribution that is capable of fairness is 
needed for these rights to apply, I would seem to have made EcoSoc rights 
less easily claimable and less practically useful outside certain specific 
societal contexts.
Whilst this may be true, it is important to point out that any alternative 
formulation of the duties and justified burdens associated with human 
rights will suffer similar or equivalent problems. Re-describing the duty to 
fulfil as a categorical requirement still faces the problem of how these 
requirements are to be supplied and by whom. One could indeed abandon 
the idea that there are countervailing considerations such that we must 
engage in Weighing. But that means giving up an essential component of 
reasonableness and fairness in practical and political reason. It would be a 
victory by stipulation only, not one responding to the practical problem of 
the existence of legitimate conflicting considerations. If we accept the 
need to adjudicate between these different considerations, then Weighing 
reasons do not weaken human rights duties but provide the only kind of 
solution that will give a significant portion of them some rational content.
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6. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, I have identified two types of reasons – or two models of 
reasoning – when determining the content of certain human rights 
obligations and justified burdens. The Decisive reasons model offers us a 
way of understanding categorical duties, whereas the Weighing reasons 
model is engaged when we must consider interests and considerations that 
need to be balanced. Provisions and interpretations that are compatible 
with both models are present in international human rights documents, 
although these documents do not explicitly recognize the need for either 
model, or any model altogether. I have argued that these models are, 
however, both necessary to make sense of, and give content to, different 
types of human rights responsibilities. I stress, these two types of reasoning 
are not designed to undermine any one type of right or duty – instead, they 
cut across different traditional distinctions between types of rights 
(Economic and Social versus Civil and Political); and they are both ways of 
explaining the duties as genuine obligations. Yet, without sensitivity to 
these forms of reasoning, trying to give content to our human rights 
obligations will lead to troubling confusions. Not all human rights duties 
are categorical and we need an account of how to determine those duties 
when they are not.
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